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In this study, objective measures of self-esteem, satisfaction with life, trait anxiety, 
and schizotypal psychopathology were administered to 493 subjects representing the full 
range of fantasy proneness as determined by their scores on the Inventory of Childhood 
Memories and Imaginings (ICMI); in addition, subjects selected for high, medium, and 
low levels of fantasy proneness were administered measures of state anxiety and coping 
skills during a stressful laboratory condition. This was done in order to contribute to the 
construct validity of fantasy proneness and to provide empirical inquiry into the nature of 
fantasy proneness as a psychological coping strategy. 
In replication of earlier research, elevated scores on the ICMI correlated with a greater 
incidence of childhood trauma, higher trait anxiety, and deeper involvement in 
schizotypal thinking and experiences. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
which indicated that a sizable minority of fantasy prone subjects exhibit serious 
psychopathology. Despite these findings, the ICMI failed to correlate significantly with 
measures of self-esteem or satisfaction with life, indicating that associated negative 
features of fantasy proneness do not preclude a healthy level of adjustment. High 
fantasizers did not differ from other subjects in their level of situational anxiety or their 
coping responses to a laboratory condition designed to elicit performance anxiety. 
However, high fantasizers did exceed the medium and low fantasizers in their self-
reported use of fantasy and imagination as a coping device. Similarly, the high fantasizers 
were significantly more likely than their less fantasy prone counterparts to report that 
fantasy and imagination were very effective in helping them cope. However, the overall 
lack of significant differences in coping styles among high, medium, and low fantasizers 
viii 
lent credence to earlier reports that the majority of high fantasizers are relatively well-
adjusted individuals. Within each of the three groups, heightened levels of anxiety were 
correlated with indices of distress and perceived lack of psychological resources needed 
to cope with the situation. There was inconclusive evidence that medium fantasizers were 
more adversely affected by heightened levels of situational anxiety than either high or 
low fantasizers. 
ix 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The current interest in fantasy proneness developed out of attempts to find stable per-
sonality and developmental correlates of hypnotic ability, particularly those attributes 
which contribute to superb hypnotic performances. Since its inception, the construct of 
fantasy proneness (Wilson & Barber, 1981/83) has generated a body of research which 
has attempted to validate the construct (Council, Greyson, Huff, 1986; Huff & Council, 
1987; Council & Huff, 1990; Lynn & Rhue, 1986), and delineate its associated features 
(Myers & Austrin, 1985; Rhue & Lynn, 1987a) and developmental antecedents (Lynn & 
Rhue, 1988; Rhue & Lynn, 1987b). 
Fantasy Proneness and Hypnosis 
Prior to Wilson and Barber's ( 1981/83) initial description of the fantasy prone per-
sonality, a number of researchers had linked hypnotic talent with various cognitive 
attributes, including vividness of mental imagery and imagin<!l skills. For example, 
Sutcliffe, Perry, and Sheehan (1970) proposed that hypnotic ability depends not so much 
on specific induction techniques as on the characteristics of the hypnotic subject. They 
suggested that the hypnotic relationship constitutes a form of legitimized fantasy or 
make-believe (see also Orne, 1959), and that a person who is already prone to fantasize 
would make an ideal hypnotic subject. However, fantasy involvement, as measured by 
dream report, was not significantly related to hypnotizability in the results obtained by 
Sutcliffe et al. ( 1970). They did, however, note a significant correlation between mental 
imagery and hypnotizability, with fantasizers tending to be classified as vivid imagers. 
A study by Spanos and McPeake ( 1975) found that hypnotic ability was significantly 
determined by both involvement in everyday imaginative activities and attitudes toward 
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hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. They concluded that an emphasis on imaginative 
activities in many aspects of one's life would tend to foster a willingness to engage in 
hypnotic experiences. Similarly, in a review of the literature, Singer and Pope ( 1981) 
stated that there was clear evidence of a relationship between daydreaming ("waking 
fantasy"), imagery vividness, and hypnotic susceptibility. 
Wilson & Barber ( 1981) first described the fantasy prone personality after conducting . 
extensive interviews comparing excellent with average hypnotic subjects. Subjects with 
superb hypnotic talent appeared unique in that they reported a high degree of involvement 
in a private world of fantasy and imagination, often spending the majority of their waking 
hours in fantasy. In addition, Wilson and Barber (1981/83) found that many of their fan-
tasy prone subjects reported vivid daydreams and memories (often experienced in all five 
sensory modalities), and belief in paranormal phenomena. Fantasy prone persons (also 
referred to as high fantasizers throughout this paper) appeared to find imagining and day-
dreaming so gratifying that they reported that life would hardly be worth living without 
these activities. The Wilson and Barber (1983) study used only female subjects, and 
recent studies of fantasy proneness have indicated that females tend to score higher on a 
measure of fantasy proneness than males (e.g., Myers & Austrin, 1985). It should also be 
noted that the only paper-and-pencil measure of fantasy proneness, the Inventory for 
Childhood Memories and Imaginings, was adapted by Wilson and Barber (1981) from 
their 103-item Memory, Imagining, and Creativity Interview Schedule. 
Subsequent investigations have generally supported Wilson and Barber's (1981/83) 
description of the fantasy prone individual, but significant discrepancies have also been 
reported. One possible reason for such discrepancies was due to bias in Wilson and 
Barber's (1981/83) method for selecting subjects; i.e., their subjects were selected on the 
basis of hypnotic responsivity alone, which virtually negated the possibility of studying 
fantasy prone subjects who did not exhibit hypnotic talent. Lynn and Rhue ( 1986) found 
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only a weak association between fantasy proneness and hypnotic ability; this finding was 
replicated in a recent study by Council and Huff ( 1990), who also found that fantasy 
prones were significantly more hypnotizable than low fantasizers, but did not differ sig-
nificantly from the middle comparison group. It should be noted that other researchers 
(e.g., Council, Kirsch, and Hafner, 1986; Kirsch, Council, and Mobayed, 1987) have pro-
duced evidence that imaginative ability/involvement may be only indirectly related to 
hypnotic responsivity. 
Despite evidence (e.g., Lynn & Rhue, 1986) suggesting that fantasy proneness is only 
moderately predictive of hypnotic talent, research has indicated that fantasy prones do 
possess several characteristics thought to mediate hypnotic responsivity. For example, a 
number of researchers (e.g., Council, Greyson, & Huff, 1986; Lynn & Rhue, 1986; Myers 
& Austrin, 1985) have found a significant correlation between fantasy proneness, hypno-
tizability, and scores on the Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), 
which assesses the tendency to become deeply involved in sensory and imaginative pro-
cesses. In addition, both Lynn and Rhue (1986, 1987a) and Council and Huff (1990) 
found that fantasy prones produced significantly higher scores than medium and low 
fantasizers on the Tellegen Absorption Scale. Absorption refers to the total attentional 
fixation on a stimulus which renders the individual relatively immune to distracting 
stimuli; it is "a full commitment of available perceptual, motoric, imaginative and 
ideational resources to a unified representation of the attentional object" (Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974, p. 274). For example, a person can be absorbed in a visual stimulus, a 
symphony, in his or her private thoughts, etc. This description of absorption is congruent 
with the cognitive style reported by Wilson and Barber's ( 1983) fantasy prone subjects, 
who tended to spend a majority of their waking time immersed in their private fantasy 
worlds, and sometimes even using fantasy to block out or deny unpleasant aspects of their 
existence. 
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Other hypothesized mediators of hypnotic ability include the experience of and toler-
ance for unusual states (As, O'Hara, & Munger, 1962), which is certainly in harmony 
with the image of fantasy proneness presented in Wilson and Barber (1983), and a con-
struct which As ( 1962) referred to as role absorption. Basically, role absorption "includes 
earlier experiences of being strongly absorbed in, or even enraptured by, something ... 
experiences of changing inner feelings and self-perceptions as a result of changes in the 
social environment, and a vivid imagination that may even take on reality character" (As, 
1962, p. 120). The fact that high fantasizers report similar experiences would possibly 
account for Wilson and Barber's (1983) contention that fantasy prones tend to exhibit 
excellent hypnotic ability. However, as previously mentioned, several investigators (Rhue 
& Lynn, 1987a; Council & Huff, 1990) found only a weak association between scores on 
a measure off antasy proneness and a measure of hypnotic responsivity, which is interest-
ing in light of recent empirical evidence (i.e., Council, Kirsch, & Hafner, 1986) suggest-
ing that expectancy effects, rather than imaginative ability, are predominantly responsible 
for the quality of hypnotic performances. 
In summary, fantasy proneness remains a somewhat elusive construct which has been 
only partially operationalized and validated. The literature on fantasy proneness has 
shown that high fantasizers are significantly more suggestible than low fantasizers but 
there were no differences between high and medium fantasizer groups. This finding is 
congruent with a growing body of evidence (e.g., Council et al. 1986) suggesting that 
hypnotic responsivity is mediated by a wide range of variables related to cognitive pro-
cesses and learning. Another consistent finding is that high fantasizers outscore medium 




In Wilson and Barber's (1981/83) research, a subset of fantasy prone subjects reported 
extensive parental encouragement of various imaginative activities; for example, many of 
them had parents who encouraged them to treat their stuffed toys as if they were living 
creatures, and it was common for these parents to read them fanciful bedtime stories. 
However, approximately-33 percent of Wilson and Barber's fantasizers reported a higher 
incidence of aversive childhood experiences than their less fantasy prone counterparts, 
including long periods of isolation from agemates and more physical punishm~nt. 
Fantasy prone subjects who reported early traumatic events stated that they used fantasy 
to escape from their unpleasant circumstances. Most of them also had a secret hiding 
place where they could find solace as they indulged in undisturbed imaginings. Hilgard 
(1979) specified a number of ways in which fantasy can function as a defense. For 
example, it can substitute for a lack of social stimulation in the isolated or lonesome 
child, or it can arise out of conflict, as when a child seeks to block out the pain of physi-
cal punishment or when the child is ruminating, perhaps vengefully, following an abusive 
episode. Fantasy prones in a recent study (Huff, 1987) reported using significantly more 
imaginative coping after being punished during childhood, and their primary use of 
imaginative coping was to block out the negative aftereffects of punishment. 
Other researchers have discovered a similar link between aversive childhood experi-
ences and hypnotic talent, with superb hypnotic subjects describing more troublesome 
developmental histories than other subjects (Nash & Lynn, 1985-86; Nash, Lynn, & 
Givens, 1984). Evidence that fantasy prones had a variety of difficulties during childhood 
may explain Council and Huff's (1990) finding that fantasy prones experience more 
guilty-dysphoric daydreaming than other subjects, as well as fantasy prones' elevated 
scores on measures of psychopathology (Huff, 1987; Rhue & Lynn, 1987). 
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In a clinical study (Crockett, 1984), fourteen women who had experienced incest 
and/or severe physical abuse in childhood were interviewed to ascertain how they coped 
with the trauma of living with an abusive parent. One of the four general coping strategies 
that emerged was the use off antasy to construct an ideal make-believe life or to contem-
plate plans of a more practical nature. The fantasizers also reported that, while being 
physically or sexually abused as children, they would sometimes enter an intense trance-
like state that helped them block out at least part of the aversive experience. Crockett 
( 1984) also observed that the fantasizers in her study appeared to lack contentment or 
satisfaction in their lives: 
Because they focus on perfection in their daydreams, the 
1
fantasizers tend 
to be dissatisfied with real situations and real people. Because they fanta-
size rather than act, they tend to drift into circumstances in which they are 
dependent on someone else. Then they resent this imperfect, more 
powerful person. Isolation deepens. So does discontent. As this occurs, 
they must work even harder to protect their pleasant inner world. Their 
possibilities of finding satisfactions in the real world diminish even 
further. The early coping methods of the fantasizers have now become 
handicaps rather than assets. (p. 64) 
One self-protective strategy that was widely reported by Wilson and Barber's (1983) 
fantasy prone subjects was the development of imaginary companions in childhood. 
Imaginary companions are conceptually related to transitional objects; i.e., familiar 
objects that represent the security associated with the parent (Fischer & Lazerson, 1984). 
Benson and Pryor (1973) pointed out that an imaginary companion is often important in 
the development of the child's object relations. In some cases, it can help prolong the 
child's sense of omnipotence and control, but can also be used as a scapegoat to divert 
blame from the self. Huff (1987) found that fantasy prones were more likely to report 
having childhood imaginary companions than nonfantasizers, but did not differ signifi-
cantly from medium fantasizers in this respect. 
The use off antasy-oriented coping mechanisms is particularly important from a 
developmental perspective, in that the content and functional aspects of fantasy change in 
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conjunction with other aspects of cognitive-emotional development (Abrams, 1985), and 
the time-investment in fantasy typically drops precipitously as the child matures into 
adolescence (Arasteh, 1968; Myers, 1983). However, it is possible that when fantasy 
activity in childhood serves an adaptive function, such as shielding the child from emo-
tional trauma, it will be integrated into a general cognitive style. The finding that most 
fantasy prones reported using fantasy as children to deny or escape from extremely stress-
ful events, and that their imaginative abilities have been preserved as a traitlike coping 
style, suggests that the cognitive style of these persons deviates considerably from the 
norm. 
Fantasy Proneness and Psychopathology 
Wilson and Barber's ( 1981/83) contention that fantasizers tend to be well-adjusted 
persons was challenged by Rhue and Lynn (1987b, 1988), who reported that fantasizers 
appeared to use fantasy for defensive as well as adaptive purposes, and that a subset of 
high fantasizers tend to produce 8/9 modal codetypes on the MMPI (Rhue & Lynn, 
1987); that is, the fantasizers displayed clinically significant elevations on scale 8 
(Schizophrenia) and scale 9 (Hypomania). Even when not clinically elevated, these scales 
tended to be the highest for the fantasy prones. Rhue & Lynn ( 1987) interpreted this 
codetype as reflecting "ideational productivity, unconventional and peculiar thinking, and 
perhaps greater alienation and preoccupation with an internal world of fantasy" (p. 16). 
Although results obtained on the Rorschach failed to yield indications of morbid 
thoughts, pronounced psychopathology, or dysphoria, there was evidence of excessive 
use of "projected" hostility which fell within a "neurotic" range. Rhue and Lynn stated 
that "Fantasizers' use of projective defenses may help modulate and channel ego dystonic 
affect toward socially appropriate ends" (p. 17). 
Rhue and Lynn (1987) also found that fantasy prones tended to display one of two 
developmental profiles, with subjects reporting the use of fantasy in childhood either to 
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cope with physical abuse or with extended periods of social isolation. Specifically, 
fantasy was used as an escape, as a safe outlet for ai;iger, or to foster the perception of a 
controllable and stable internal "environment." When the subjects were asked about their 
psychiatric history, the great majority of high fantasizers in the Rhue and Lynn study 
reported neither psychiatric hospitalizations, the use of psychotropic medications, nor 
involvement with mental health professionals. In addition, most fantasizers rated them-
selves as being moderately-to-extremely well-adjusted on a self-report questionnaire. The 
fact that unpleasant and lonely childhoods were over-represented among the fantasizers, 
and that they used fantasy to cope with aversive childhood experiences, caused Rhue and 
Lynn to conclude that fantasizers most often use fantasy for defensive or adaptive 
purposes. This conclusion was further supported by the finding that fantasizers 
acknowledged having more personal problems and yet rated themselves as being 
psychologically well-adjusted. 
Huff ( 1987) found that fantasy prones, as compared to other groups, registered 
significantly lower scores on the Ego Strength research scale of the MMPI, suggesting 
the presence of poor self-concept, feelings of helplessness, and "problems that are 
characterological rather than situational in nature" (Graham, 1977). Mean scores on the 
MMPI Anxiety and Repression (research) scales indicated that high fantasizers tend to fit 
the High A-Low.R profile described by Graham (1977). 
Subjects falling into this ( category) may be expected to be introspective, 
ruminative and overideational, with complaints of worrying and nervous-
ness. There may be chronic feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, and 
insecurity which are often accompanied by rich fantasies with sexual 
content. Emotional difficulties may interfere with judgment, so that they 
are seen as lacking common sense. Patients in this ( category) do not use 
somatic defenses, and although they seem to admit problems readily, the 
prognosis (for psychotherapy) is poor. (p. 85) 
In a recent study (Council & Huff, 1990), a group of fantasy prone subjects appeared 
more likely than other subjects to engage in positive-constructive daydreaming (i.e., day-
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dreams that reflect positive affect, assist the person in problem-solving of personal 
problems, and are vivid in terms of visual and aural qualities) and guilty-dysphoric day-
dreaming (i.e., daydreams that are characterized by negative affect, such as guilt and fear, 
and content involving failure, aggression, and revenge), as measured on the Short 
Imaginal Processes Inventory (Huba, Singer, Aneshensel, & Antrobus, 1982). Council 
and Huff (1990) interpreted these findings as supporting Rhue and Lynn's (1987a) 
contention that a subset of fantasizers are maladjusted or evidence deviant thinking. Thus, 
the content of fantasy prone persons' daydreams may not be as uniformly gratifying as 
Wilson and Barber ( 1981/83) have suggested. However, Council and Huff (1990) also 
found that fantasizers were no more likely to report mindwandering, drifting thoughts or 
distractibility in everyday life, as measured on the SIPI, suggesting that fantasy prones do 
not exhibit poor attentional control. 
In sum, the literature on antecedents of excellent hypnotic and imaginative ability 
suggests that fantasy proneness may develop as a means of coping with aversive or 
traumatic experiences in childhocxl, or as a result of parental encouragement of fantasy 
(Rhue & Lynn, 1987; Wilson & Barber, 1983). In high fantasizers, imagination and 
fantasy may become integrated into the personality as a major coping style during early 
development, and these persons may not experience the decline in imaginative skills 
which is typically exhibited by other children. Finally, high fantasizers are more likely 
than medium or low fantasizers to report both positive-constructive and guilty-dysphoric 
daydreams, which is consistent with the data reported by Rhue and Lynn (1987a) indicat-
ing that a subset of fantasizers are maladjusted or exhibit aberrant thinking. However, 
while a relatively small proportion off antasy prone subjects do exhibit significant levels 
of psychopathology (Rhue & Lynn, 1987a), most of them do not appear to be severely 
maladjusted. 
CHAPTER II: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order to develop evidence for the construct validity of fantasy proneness, measures 
were included in this study that allowed the replication and extension of findings in the 
literature. Phase 1 of this study employed several paper-and-pencil measures of anxiety, 
aversive childhood experiences, self-esteem, satisfaction with life, and schizotypal 
ideation for construction validation purposes. A demographic questionnaire and a 
measure of religiosity were also included. Phase 2 involved exposing subjects to a 
potentially anxiety-provoking laboratory situation, with the aim of assessing the coping 
responses of high, medium, and low fantasizers. 
Phase 1 
The study focused on a recent finding (Huff, 1987) that fantasy prones produced 
evidence of schizotypal ideation on the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1967), while 
elevating the Anxiety scales on both the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (Millon, 
1984) and the MMPI. Fantasy prones have consistently asserted their deep and pervasive 
imaginal involvement, and they appear to have higher than average levels of odd and 
"schizotypic" ideation, as measured both on the MMPI and in structured interviews 
(Rhue & Lynn, 1987; Huff, 1987). In the present study, support for the construct validity 
of fantasy proneness was sought through two measures of schizotypal thought processes, 
i.e., the Cognitive Slippage Scale and the Magical Ideation Scale. 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was included in order to replicate earlier research 
(Huff, 1987) indicating that fantasy prones exhibit a surplus of anxiety. Because fantasiz-
ers appear to crave their fantasy worlds as much or more than human contact and report 
higher levels of isolation and aversive interactions during childhood (Wilson & Barber, 
10 
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1983), it was hypothesized that they would exhibit more anxiety than their less fantasy 
prone counterparts on the ST AI. 
Finally, reports of aversive childhood experiences among fantasy prones have been 
consistently reported in the literature (e.g., Rhue & Lynn, 1987b; Wilson & Barber, 
1983). Therefore, it was hypothesized that high fantasizers would register lower self-
esteem on the Index of Self-Esteem (ISE; Hudson, 1982), lower satisfaction with life on 
the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, et al. 1985), and attain higher scores on 
the Survey of Traumatic Childhood Events (STCE; Council & Edwards, 1986) than 
medium and low fantasizers. 
Phase 2 
Phase 2 of the study consisted of individual sessions designed to assess how high 
fantasy subjects differ from medium and low fantasizers in how they perceive, cope and 
respond to an anxiety-provoking situation. Based on the above-cited evidence that 
fantasizers use their imaginal skills to cope with unpleasant experiences, it was 
hypothesized that they would report a disproportionate use of fantasy as a coping 
mechanism. The measure of anxiety allowed for inferences as to whether the fantasy 
prone subjects' use of fantasy as a defensive or coping mechanism was effective in 
minimizing their self-perceived anxiety. 
CHAPTER III: METHOD 
Subjects 
This study was comprised of two phases: Phase 1 served the dual function of provid-
ing a large p<X)l of subjects for purposes of construct validation and to screen subjects for 
Phase 2, an empirical study of fantasy proneness as a method of coping with stress. 
Subjects were recruited from intrcx:luctory c·ourses in psychology at the University of 
North Dakota. Subjects participated for course credit and signed consent was obtained. A 
total of 658 subjects (i.e., 485 females and 173 males) participated in the study. Of these, 
493 subjects (i.e., 352 females and 141 males) were administered the entire Phase 1 
questionnaire battery, while the remaining 165 took only the ICMI in order to be screened 
for Phase 2. Selection criteria for Phase 2 are described below. 
On the basis of their scores on the ICMI, female subjects were screened for Phase 2; 
males were excluded due to the paucity of male high fantasizers within the subject p<X)l. 
High and low fantasizers were selected on the basis of their scores falling above the 96th 
percentile and below the 5th percentile, respectively; i.e., those who scored above 36 ( out 
of a possible 52) were classified as high fantasizers, while those who scored below 12 
were classified as low fantasizers. Medium fantasizers were randomly selected from those 
who obtained scores within one-half standard deviation above or below the mean. Group 
size and ICMI scores for the three groups were as follows: High fantasizers (n=l2; 
M= 38.3, SD= 2.4); medium fantasizers (n=l3; M= 21.5, SD= 2.1); low fantasizers 




Phase 1 Self-report Questionnaires 
The Cognitive Slippage Scale (CSS; Miers & Raulin, 1985) is a measure of cognitive 
impairment which focuses on cognitive slippage, a primary aspect of schizophrenic 
thought processes. Subjects respond to a selection of self-statements as being true or false 
in terms of applicability to the respondent. Hallucinations, delusions, speech deficits, 
attentional disorders, and confused thinking are all manifestations of cognitive slippage, 
but the CSS deals mainly with speech deficits and confused thinking. Corcoran and 
Fischer (1987) suggested that "Although the scale was developed to identify schizotypic 
characteristics, it may also be useful in identifying cognitive disorders among other popu-
lations" (p. 125). Although no test-retest correlations are available for the CSS, it has 
been shown to possess excellent internal consistency with alphas of .87 for males and .90 
for females; furthermore, it was found to correlate significantly with several other scales 
that tap into schizotypic characteristics (e.g., perceptual aberration, intense ambivalence, 
social fear, magical ideation, somatic symptoms, and distrust) (Miers & Raulin, 1985). 
The Demographic Questionnaire (DQ) samples a range of demographic and 
behavioral data of potential relevance to the study of fantasy proneness.· For example, this 
study sought to confirm Huff's (1987) finding that fantasy prones were significantly more 
likely to be first-born children than medium and low fantasizers. Other developmental 
data, such as the number of close friendships during childhcxxl, are also assessed. 
The Index of Self-Esteem (ISE; Hudson, 1982) is a 25-item scale designed to measure 
the severity of a problem that a subject may have with self-esteem. Self-esteem, as a 
component of the broader construct of self-concept, is evaluative in nature. Each item is 
responded to on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from "rarely or none of the time" to 
"most or all of the time." The ISE has been shown to possess a mean alpha of .93 and a 
14 
two hour test-retest correlation of .92. According to Corcoran and Fischer (1987), this 
scale has also been shown to have good known-groups validity and construct validity. 
The Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMt Myers, 1983) was 
adapted from the interview format developed by Wilson and Barber ( 1983) as a measure 
of fantasy proneness; with this measure, the subject endorses any of 52 items which apply 
to him or her. The items are self-statements which cover the range of phenomena that 
have been repeatedly associated with fantasy-proneness (e.g., having had an imaginary 
companion during childhood, belief in paranormal experiences, vivid childhood 
memories). In a review of the literature, Lynn and Rhue (1988) reported that the ICMI 
has been found to possess adequate validity and reliability. For example, high fantasizers 
have been shown to differ from both medium and low fantasizers on measures of hypno-
tizability, response to waking suggestion, creativity, and absorption. 
The Magical Ideation Scale (MIS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) was designed to assess 
the magical thoughts characteristic of schizotypal disorders, and is also regarded as a 
measure of proneness to psychosis. According to Corcoran and Fischer (1987), tl)e 
magical ideation which is measured on the MIS is defined as "the belief in what general 
Western culture would consider invalid causation, such as superstitiousness, clairvoy-
ance, telepathy, and so on. The focus of the MIS is not on the credibility of these forms of 
causation, but the respondent's personal beliefs and experiences" (p. 218). The internal 
consistency of this scale is rather good, with correlations of .82 for males and .85 for 
females; the MIS was also found to correlate significantly with measures of perceptual 
aberration, physical anhedonism, and psychoticism, suggesting that this scale possesses 
adequate concurrent validity (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). According to Corcoran and 
Fischer (1987), "Known-groups validity was evident with differences on psychotic and 
psychoticlike symptoms for subjects whose MIS scores were two standard deviations 
above the mean and a control group" (p. 218). Rhue and Lynn ( 1987b) reported that their 
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fantasy prone subjects produced significant elevations on the MIS, but did not provide 
actual scores or significance levels. The MIS was included in this study to both replicate 
Rhue and Lynn's (1987b) findings and to supply actual scores and significance levels. 
Fantasy prone subjects should attain higher scores than medium and low fantasizers on 
the Magical Ideation Scale, due to their schizotypal profiles as measured on the MMPI 
(Huff, 1987; Rhue & Lynn, 1988). 
The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, et al. 1985) was designed to assess 
subjective life satisfaction. Both internal consistency and test-retest reliability have been 
established, as indicated by an alpha of .87 and a correlation of .82, respectively. 
Concurrent validity has also been demonstrated, according to Corcoran and Fischer, 
1987). 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; 
Vagg, Spielberger, & O'Heam, 1980) is a widely-used measure of both situational and 
chronic/pervasive anxiety. The Trait-Anxiety scale (STAI-TA) consists of 20 items, 
scored on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from "not at all" to "very much so", which 
evaluate how subjects generally feel. The test-retest correlation for the STAI-TA was 
found to average .77 for college students. In terms of internal consistency, Spiel berger 
( 1983) reported a median coefficient alpha of .93. The concurrent validity of the ST AI-
TA was established by demonstrating its correlation (.80 for college males and .79 for 
college females) with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953). 
The Survey of Religious Attitudes and Beliefs (SRA) is a collection of 22 items from 
a national survey of religiosity among American politicians (Benson & Williams, 1982). 
The psychometric properties of these items have not been investigated. 
The Survey of Traumatic Childhood Events (STCE; Council & Edwards, 1986) is a 
30-item pencil-and-paper questionnaire which was designed to explore a wide range of 
negative childhood experiences. It samples a broad spectrum of traumatic or abusive 
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situations, such as a serious illness or injury, having one's parents divorce, or experienc-
ing some fonn of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, occurring during childhood, and 
the subject is asked to list the number of occurrences for each event as a way of indexing 
the extent of early trauma. No reliability or validity statistics are available for this 
measure. 
Phase 2 Self-report Questionnaires 
In addition to the research scales described below, the author of the study developed a 
series of 14 additional questions (AQ), each of which taps into various coping-related 
variables such as tension level, self-efficacy, outcome expectancy, and use of fantasy and 
imagination. All of the AQ items are presented in Likert-type fonnat. 
The Dakota Cognitive Appraisal Inventory (DCAI; Hexum & Holm, 1990) is a scale 
designed to measure an individual's appraisal process pertaining to a specific situation or 
event. It is a 49-item questionnaire that has two dimensions. The first dimension, consist-
ing of 10 items, assesses the individual's primary and secondary appraisal of a situation. 
Primary appraisal refers to deciding whether an event/situation was irrelevant, benign-
positive, or stressful (e.g., "This event/situation was very important to my physical, 
psychological, or emotional well-being."). Secondary appraisal refers to evaluating the 
availability of resources (e.g., physical, social, psychological) needed to cope with the 
situation (e.g., "I had the physical resources available (health, energy, stamina) that I 
needed to cope with this event/situation."). The second dimension, which makes up the 
remaining 39 items, is composed of seven subscales: a) Personal Comprehensibility and 
Control, b) Other Control, c) Predictability, d) Personal Familiarity, e) Vicarious 
Familiarity, f) Meaning[ ulness, and g) Situational Comprehensibility and Control. 
Personal Comprehensibility and Control refers to the degree to which the individual 
feels he or she controls, influences, and understand his or her thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors during an event or situation (e.g., "I knew what was expected of me during this 
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event/situation."). In contrast, Other Control is the belief that some outside force controls 
the outcome of an event (e.g., "I believed that someone/something I trusted could 
influence the outcome of this event/situation."). Predictability is the degree to which the 
individual can know in advance the outcome of a transaction (e.g., "I was very sure that 
this event/situation would occur."). Personal Familiarity assesses the individual's 
familiarity with the present situation due to having similar experiences (e.g., "This is a 
completely new experience for me."), while Vicarious Familiarity measures the extent to 
which an event is familiar because of vicarious experiences such as friends, books, or 
television (e.g., "I was very familiar with this event/situation because one of my 
friends/family had been in it before."). Meaningfulness is a subscale which identifies the 
degree of personal involvement or commitment to a situation (e.g., "I felt this 
event/situation was important and worthwhile."). Finally, Situational Comprehensibility 
and Control refers to an individual's appraisal of how comprehensible the situation was 
and how much control he or she had over the various aspects of the environment (e.g., "I 
knew I could influence the outcome of this event/situation."). 
r Hexum and Holm (1990) have reported that most of these subscales have 
demonstrated adequate reliability. They reported that with the exception of the vicarious 
familiarity scale, split-half reliability coefficients ranged from .68 to .82, internal consis-
tency coefficients (Chronbach's alpha) ranged from .67 to .86, and two week test-retest 
correlations ranged from .66 to .87. The exception, the vicarious familiarity subscale, 
may not be reliable as Chronbach's alpha was only .17, the split-half reliability 
coefficient was only .14, and the two week test-retest correlation was .49. Hexum and 
Holm ( 1990) have also reported that preliminary data suggests that the DCAI appears to 
be a valid measure of appraisal as it is related to measures of similar constructs and 
discriminates among measures of divergent constructs. 
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The Dimensional Coping Checklist (DCC; Kaloupek, 1987) is a post hoc assessment 
of coping in a stressful situation. It is a 24-item checklist with three coping dimensions. 
The first concerns the focus of coping thoughts and behavior. It examines the degree to 
which the coping effort is focused externally on the environment or internally on the self. 
The second dimension assesses the direction of the coping; that is, whether the individual 
approaches or avoids the situation. The third dimension deals with the production of the 
coping. It examines the location on the continuum of active to passive coping styles. Each 
item contributes to one or more of the dimensions (e.g., "I was analyzing the details of 
the situation."; focus is on environment, direction is approach and production is active) 
and thus, each subject gets three scores, one for each dimension ranging from O to 100. 
No reliability or validity information is currently available for this scale. 
As noted in the previous section, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Vagg, Spielberger, & O'Heam, 1980) was 
designed to measure both situational and chronic anxiety. The State-Anxiety scale (ST AI-
SA) consists of twenty self-statements that appraise state anxiety; i.e., how subjects feel 
"right now, at this moment." E.ach item is responded to on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
from "not at all" to "very much so." The test-retest correlation for the STAI-SA was 
found to average .33 for college students; this low correlation was anticipated for the 
STAI-SA "because a valid measure of state anxiety should reflect the influence of unique 
situational factors that exist at the time of testing" (Spielberger, 1983). Evidence for the 
construct validity of the STAI-SA was demonstrated by showing that college students 
who were asked to respond according to how they would feel prior to an important 
examination obtained significantly higher scores than students tested under normative 
conditions (Spielberger, 1983). 
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Video Equipment 
Laboratory equipment consisted of a videocamera connected to a monitor located in 
an adjacent room and observed by the research assistant for signs of extreme distress, in 
case the procedure needed to be aborted. Subjects were informed that they would deliver 
a speech that would possibly be observed and rated by an unspecified panel of "faculty 
judges." 
Design and Procedure 
The following measures were administered during Phase 1 of the study (in order of 
presentation): Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings, State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory-Trait Anxiety, Demographic Survey, Survey of Religious Attitudes and 
Beliefs, Satisfaction With Life Scale, Survey of Traumatic Childhood Events, Magical 
Ideation Scale, Cognitive Slippage Scale, and the Index of Self-Esteem. These measures 
were presented to subjects as an assessment of 'various aspects of your thinking and 
experiences,' and were administered in group sessions. Subjects were informed that, on 
the basis of their test results, a small portion of them would be asked to return in order to 
participate in Phase 2 of the study. 
Upon returning for Phase 2, subjects were asked to consent to participate in a 
potentially anxiety-provoking research project. The consent form informed subjects that 
they would be asked to deliver a prepared speech on short notice, in front of a 
videocamera. Furthermore, they were told that their videotape "may or may not" be rated 
by a panel of faculty judges at a later date; however, they were not told what criteria 
constituted a positive performance. After obtaining consent, subjects were handed the 
script for their presentation and told that they would have four minutes to read it over, 
following which the script would be taken from them for an additional four minutes, 
giving them time to "mentally rehearse" how they would present the script on camera. At 
the time the script was taken away, each subject was told: "Research has shown that there 
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is great variety in the ways that people cope with performance-related events. Since this 
procedure tends to make some people anxious, I would encourage you to make free use of 
whatever personal methods you normally use to cope with stress." 
Immediately following the speech preparation phase, the research assistant 
administered the State-Trait Anxiety Scale-State Anxiety, Dakota Cognitive Appraisal 
Inventory, Dimensional Coping Checklist, and the 14 Additional Questions in order to 
assess the subject's current level of anxiety as well as the coping strategies used by the 
subjects to minimize stress levels. Following this assessment, the subject delivered the 
speech to the videocamera, was informed that her speech had not been preselected for 
viewing by faculty judges, and exited the laboratory. 
CHAPTERIV:RESULTS 
Phase 1 
Correlational analyses were done with all subjects and then separately with females 
and then males. The test of difference between two independent correlation coefficients 
was used to determine significant sex differences. Table 1 presents correlations between 
the ICMI and the major dependent variables. Most correlations were highly significant 
due to the large sample size; however, no significant sex differences were found. In terms 
of the total sample, the ICMI correlated with measures of trait anxiety, childhood trauma, 
Table 1 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations Between the ICMI and Measures of Anxiety, 
Psychopathology, Satisfaction With Life, and Self-Esteem for All Subjects, Females, and 
Males 
All Subjects Females Males 
(N::493) (n=352) (n=l41) 
Correlation Probability Correlation Probability Correlation Probability 
Scale Coefficient Level Coefficient Level Coefficient Level 
STAI-TA .22 .001 .18 .001 .31 .001 
STCE .38 .001 .39 .001 .38 .001 
MIS .59 .001 .60 .001 .57 .001 
css .40 .0()1 .42 .001 .36 .001 
SWLS -.04 .17 .00 .48 -.16 .03 
ISE .05 .12 .04 .22 .08 .16 
Note. Scales are as follows: ST AI-TA = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Anxiety; 
SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale; MIS= Magical Ideation Scale; CSS = Cognitive 
Slippage Scale; ISE = Index of Self-Esteem. 
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cognitive slippage, and the magical ideations characteristic of schizotypal disorders at the 
.001 level of significance. There was no significant correlation between the ICMI and 
measures of self-esteem or satisfaction with life. 
Table 2 presents correlations between the ICMI and subscales on the Survey of 
Traumatic Childhood Events. There was only one significant sex difference, with higher 
Table 2 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations Between the I CMI and the STCE subscales for all 
Subjects, Females, and Males 
All Subjects Females Males 
(N=493) (n=352) (n=141) 
STCE Correlation Probability Correlation Probability Correlation Probability 
Subscales Coefficient Level Coefficient Level Coefficient Level 
1 .14 .01 .14 .01 .08 .17 
2 .26 .001 .26 .0()1 .21 .01 
3 .19 .001 .21 .001 .16 .03 
4 .19 .001 .18 .001 .20 .01 
5 .21 .001 .19 .001 .31 .001 
6 .21 .001 .23 .001 .14 .05 
7 .20 .001 .21 .001 .16 .03 
8 .17 .001 .18 .001 .17 .03 
9 .32 .001 .36 .001 .23 .01 
10 .10 .01 .17 .01 .03 .35 
11 .12 .01 .11 .02 .10 .12 
12 -.06 .10 .oot .48 -.20t .01 
13 .12 .01 .11 .02 .13 .06 
Note: STCE = Survey of Traumatic Childhood Events. STCE subscales are as follows: 
1 = Incestual experiences; 2 = Extraf amilial sexual abuse; 3 = Verbal or physical abuse 
by family members; 4 = Witnessing verbal or physical family conflict; 5 = Physical abuse 
by nonf amily members; 6 = Major injury or death of a family member; 7 = Serious 
personal illness or injury; 8 = Major injury or death of a close friend; 9 = Extended social 
isolation; 10 = Being confronted by a robber; 11 = Experience with parents' divorce, 
separation, abortion, or miscarriage; 12 = Vandalizing, robbing, or destruction of home; 
13 = Moving to a new town, changing schools. 
t refers to a significant sex difference (Q<.05). 
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ICMI scores in males being associated.with fewer experiences of having their home 
vandalized, robbed, or destroyed, and females showing no relationship between ICMI 
scores and such experiences. In terms of the total sample, there were four correlation 
coefficients (ranging from .10 to .14) significant at the .01 level and eight (ranging from 
.17 to .32) that were significant at the .001, indicating a significant concordance between 
the fantasy proneness measure and a broad range of aversive experiences in childhood. 
Table 3 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations Between the I CMI and I terns on the Demographic 




















Correlation Probability Correlation Probability Correlation Probability 
Coefficient Level Coefficient Level Coefficient Level 
-.10 .015 -.13 .008 -.01 .46 
-.07 .054 -.10 .03 .00 .49 
-.01 .44 -.01 .40 .00 .49 
-.~ .03 -.14t .006 .08t .18 
-.12 .003 -.12 .01 -.13 .06 
-.04 .17 -.05 .19 -.03 .37 
-.07 .07 -.03 .29 -.17 .02 
.39 .001 .38 .001 .45 .001 
.14 .001 .17 .002 .13 .06 
.22 .001 .22 .001 .21 .006 
.23 .001 .20 .001 .29 .001 
Note. Demographic Questionnaire items are as follows: 1 = Total family size; 2 = Birth 
order; 3 = Number of younger brothers; 4 = Number of older brothers; 5 = Number of 
younger sisters; 6 = Number of older sisters; 7 = Average number of close friends in 
childhood; 8 = Average vividness of dreams; 9 = Emotional valence of dreams 
(unpleasant vs. pleasant); 10 = Average percentage of dreams recalled the next day; 
11 = Average percentage of lucid dreaming. 
t refers to a significant sex difference (Q<.05). 
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Table 3 contains the correlations between the ICMI and the Demographic 
Questionnaire. Across the total sample, those who scored higher on the ICMI reported 
having a smaller family size, and fewer older brothers and younger sisters. In general, 
females seemed to account for most of this variance, as they produced significant 
(Q<.05) correlations on eight out of the 11 items, whereas males produced only four 
significant correlations. However, despite this discrepancy, there was only one significant 
sex difference, on the item dealing with the number of older brothers. Females who 
scored high on the fantasy proneness measure reported having ,fewer older brothers than 
females who scored lower on the ICMI. Males did not show a relationship between ICMI 
scores and the number of their older brothers. Only the items dealing with dream 
phenomena produced correlations at the .OCH level of significance. This can partially be 
explained by the fact that the ICMI contains one item dealing with vividness of dreams 
and one item that covers lucid dreaming. In general, higher ICMI scores were associated 
with greater vividness and pleasantness of dreams, lucid dreaming, and better recall of 
dreams. 
Correlations between the ICMI and the Religious Beliefs Questionnaire are presented 
in Table 4. For the total sample, only seven out of the 27 items produced correlation 
coefficients that were significant. There was only one significant sex difference, with 
females who scored high on the ICMI expressing more belief that what happens in 
peoples lives is strongly influenced by their abilities and skills; males, however, did not 
produce a significant correlation between the ICMI and this item. Most of the significant 
correlations involved items devoted to religious or mystical experiences, rather than 
attitudes, behaviors, or dogmatic beliefs. Specifically, higher scores on the ICMI were 
associated with such experiences as being spoken to by God, feeling God's presence, 
feeling one with God and with the universe, and receiving a specific answer to prayer. 
Belief in life after death was also significantly correlated with higher ICMI scores. 
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Table4 
Correlations* Between the ICMI and the Survey of Relieous Attitudes and Beliefs for all Subjects, 
Females. and Males 
All Subjects Females Males 
(N=493) (n=352) (n=l41) 
Religion Correlation Probability Correlation Probability Correlation Probability 
Questionnaire Coefficient Level Coefficient Level Coefficient Level 
1 .04 .20 .01 .42 .05 .26 
2 -.01 .41 .02 33 -.06 .25 
3 -.ITT .06 -.10 .03 -.02 .42 
4 -.01 .44 .05 .16 -.11 .OCJ 
5 .04 .17 -.01 .42 .14 .052 
6 .05 .16 .03 .27 .ITT .21 
7 -.05 .13 .05 .17 -.04 33 
8 .~ .03 .ITT .11 .11 .OCJ 
9 -.00 .48 -.02 37 -.00 .49 
10 .05 .12 .~ .06 -.03 38 
11 .05 .14 .llt .02 -.09t .14 
12 .02 33 .04 .23 -.03 38 
13 .04 .20 .~ .~ -.~ .17 
14 -.12 .005 -.10 .03 -.16 .03 
15 -.25 .001 -.22 .001 -.31 .001 
16 -.21 .001 -.20 .001 -.23 .004 
17 -.27 .001 -.29 .001 -.24 .003 
18 -.04 .17 -.02 32 -.~ .16 
19 -.01 .44 -.03 .29 .04 33 
20 -.14 .002 -.10 .03 -.22 .005 
21 -.04 .20 .00 .49 -.OCJ .14 
22 -.01 .45 -.01 .45 .01 .48 
23 .04 .18 .03 .26 -~ .17 
24 -.02 34 .01 .44 -.ITT .22 
25 .02 35 -~ .06 -.OCJ .14 
26 -.12 .005 -.10 .03 -.14 .045 
27 -.05 .14 -.02 36 -.13 .06 
Note. Religious Beliefs Questionnaire items are as follows: 1 = Belief in God; 2 = Involvement of God in 
one's life; 3 = Life after death; 4 = Influence of God in one's life; 5 = Influence of Gcxl in peoples' lives; 6 
= Influence of Satan in peoples' lives; 7 = Influence of free will in peoples' lives; 8 = Influence of the 
social system in peoples' lives; 9 = Influence of values and motives in peoples' lives; 10 = Influence of the 
environment in peoples' lives; 11 = Influence of abilities and skills in peoples' lives; 12 = Influence of 
inherited traits and capacities in people's lives; 13 = Image of hwnan nature; 14 = Experience of being 
spoken to by God; 15 = Experience of feeling God's presence; 16 = Experience of feeling one with God; 17 
= Experience of feeling united with the universe; 18 = Experience of being born again; 19 = Experience of 
speaking in tongues; 20 = Experience of having prayers answered; 21 = Importance of one's religious 
beliefs; 22 = Membership in a church or synagogue; 23 = Level of church attendance; 24 = Time spent 
reading scripture; 25 = Time spent in prayer; 26 = Belief in life after death; 27 = Belief in God's role in 
writing scripture. 
* Items 14-20 and 22 are point biserial correlations, all others are Pearson Prcxluct Moment Correlations. 
t refers to a significant sex difference (12<.05). 
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Phase 2 
Only females participated in Phase 2, and subjects were sorted into groups of high, 
medium, and low fantasizers. Correlational analyses were done within groups using 
Pearson Product Moment correlations to determine the relationship between the measure 
of state anxiety (STAI-SA) and the other dependent measures. Due to the size of the 
groups (n<20), it was inadvisable to test for group differences among the correlation 
coefficients. 
In comparing the three groups, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOV A) and 
univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) were also conducted. The Wilk' s Criterion was 
used for interpreting MANOV As. If the initial analysis was significant, then subscale 
scores were analyzed using ANOV As. Tukey' s studentized range test was used for post 
hoc comparisons of the scale means for each group. 
Multivariate and Univariate Analysis 
A MANOV A was done using the three subscales (i.e., Direction, Production, and 
Focus) of the DCC as dependent variables. The effect of ICMI was nonsignificant 
[E(2, 37)=1.30; 12=.27]. Three separate MANOVAs were done on the subscales compris-
ing the three dimensions of the DCAI. The MANOVA on the seven subscales (i.e., 
Personal Comprehensibility and Control, Other Control, Predictability, Personal 
Familiarity, Vicarious Familiarity, Meaningfulness, and Situational Comprehensibility 
and Control) that cover important beliefs related to coping ability was nonsignificant 
[E(2, 36)=1.09; 12=.39]. The MANOVA on the five Primary Appraisal subscales was non-
significant [E(2, 38)=.213, 12=.99], as was the MANOVA on the five Secondary Appraisal 
subscales [E(2, 38)=.424, 12=.93]. Finally, separate ANOV As were done on each of the 
AQ items (see Table 5). Of these, only the effect of group on item seven [E(2, 37)=6.49, 
J2<.004] and item eight (1:(2, 36)=6.42, J2<.004] were significant. Tukey's studentized 
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Table 5 
Pairwise Comparisons of AO items using Tukey's Studentized Range Test for High, 
Medium, and Low Fantasizers 
Level of fantasy proneness 
High Medium Low 
(n=l2) (n=l3) (n=l6) 
AQ items Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1 2.83 1.47 3.08 2.10 2.83 1.83 
2 2.25 1.91 1.85 1.21 2.56 1.46 
3 1.92 1.00 2.15 1.46 2.38 1.59 
4 2.92 1.98 2.85 2.19 3.06 1.48 
5 3.33 1.37 2.46 1.13 2.94 1.69 
6 3.50 1.57 3.85 2.04 3.38 1.75 
7 2.923 2.02 4.77b 1.48 5.13b 1.51 
8 2 . .soa 1.93 4.46b 1.71 4_93b 1.77 
9 4.50 2.30 5.08 1.93 5.00 1.86 
10 4.00 2.26 4.91 1.92 4.46 1.85 
11 4.50 2.12 4.33 1.88 4.92 1.78 
12 2.17 1.34 2.31 1.84 2.81 1.80 
13 2.58 .79 2.23 .83 2.25 1.07 
14 2.50 1.57 2.85 1.77 2.56 1.26 
Note. AQ = Additional Questions. AQ items were in Likert-type format as follows: 
1 = Calm vs. tense; 2 = Interested vs. disinterested; 3 = Competent vs. not competent; 
4 = Good concentration vs. poor concentration; 5 = Concerned vs. unconcerned; 
6 = Extremely embarrassed vs. not at all embarrassed; 7 = Using a great deal of 
imagination vs. using no imagination; 8 = Imagination being extremely useful for coping 
vs. imagination not being at all useful; 9 = Extremely helpful imagining you were some-
one else vs. not at all helpful imagining you were someone else; 10 = Extremely helpful 
imagining you were someplace else vs. not at all helpful imagining you were someplace 
else; 11 = Extremely helpful imagining you possessed talents you do not really have vs. 
not at all helpful imagining you possessed talents you do not really have; 12 = Feeling 
very tense vs. feeling not at all tense; 13 = Feeling not at all effective in coping with the 
speech situation vs. feeling extremely effective in dealing with the speech situation; 14 = 
Expecting to do extremely well in delivering the news story vs. expecting to do an 
extremely poor job. 
For any given measure, scores labeled with superscripts a orb are significantly different 
from each other at Q<.05. Scores with the same superscript are not significantly different 
from each other. 
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range test revealed significant group differences at the .05 level, with high fantasizers 
exceeding both medium and low fantasizers on both items; however, the medium and low 
fantasizers did not differ significantly on these two items. Thus, the high fantasy group 
reported using more imagination and fantasy to cope with the task than did the two 
comparison groups, and also believed that imagination and fantasy were more useful in 
the coping process. 
Correlational Analyses 
STAI-SA and Measures of Coping. All three groups produced significant correlations 
between the STAI-SA and various subscales on the DCAI (see Table 6). For high 
fantasizers, increasing levels of anxiety were inversely related to their perception that 
they controlled, influenced, and understood their thoughts, feelings and behaviors during 
the task. Higher ST Al-SA scores also corresponded to reports that the task was not a 
positive experience and that subjects felt hurt (physically, psychologically, or 
emotionally) by the experience. Finally, increasing levels of anxiety were also correlated 
with their perception that they lacked the physical resources (e.g., healthy, stamina) and 
psychological resources (e.g., attitudes, problem-solving skills) needed to cope. 
Only the medium group prcxluced significant correlations between the measure of state 
anxiety and scales on the DCC. Negative correlations between the STAI-SA and the 
Direction and Focus subscales indicated that, medium fantasizers experiencing greater 
anxiety tended to be more avoidant and to focus more on environmental factors rather 
than on personal reactions. Subjects in the medium group who scored higher on the 
STAI-SA tended to believe they had decreasing levels of control, influence, and under-
standing of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors during the task; they also tended to 
appraise the situation as being less comprehensible and indicated that they had relatively 




Pearson Prcxluct Moment Correlations Between the STAI-SA and DCC subscales and DCAI 
subscales for High, Medium, and Low Fantasizers 
Level of fantasy 12roneness 
High Medium Low 
(n=12) (n=13) (n=16) 
Correlation Probability Correlation Probability Correlation Probability 
Subscale Coefficient Level Coefficient Level Coefficient Level 
DIRECT -.26 .21 -.67 .007 -.07 .41 
PRODUCT .00 .50 .07 .42 .05 .43 
FOCUS -.28 .18 -.53 .03 .10 .36 
PCC -.60 .02 -.68 .005 .~ .39 
OCONT -.35 .14 .20 .26 .55 .01 
PRED -.35 .15 -.15 .31 -.03 .46 
sec -.34 .14 -.62 .02 .~ .39 
VFAM -.40 .10 .10 .37 -.07 .40 
FAM -.27 .20 .21 .25 .28 .14 
MEAN -.29 .18 -.14 .33 -.20 .22 
PA 1 .15 .32 -.13 .34 .24 .18 
PA2 -.64 .01 -.37 .11 -.42 .054 
PA3 -.14 .33 .84 .001 .58 .01 
PA4 .83 .001 .68 .007 .39 .07 
PAS -.45 .07 -.19 .26 .33 .11 
SA 1 -.61 .02 -.70 .005 -.57 .01 
SA2 .04 .45 -.28 .18 -.24 .18 
SA3 -.12 .36 -.26 .20 -.38 .07 
SA4 -.83 .001 -.75 .003 -.69 .003 
SAS -.45 .07 -.(,6 .~ -.52 .02 
Note. DCC subscales are as follows: Direct = Direction; Prcxluct = Prcxluction; Focus. DCAI 
subscales are as follows: PCC = Personal Comprehensibility and Controt OCONT = Other 
Control; PRED = Predictability; SCC = Situational Comprehensibility and Control; VFAM = 
Vicarious Familiarity; FAM = Personal Familiarity; MEAN = Meaningfulness. Remaining DCAI 
scales are individual items, where PA= Primary Appraisal and SA= Secondary Appraisal. 
PA 1 = This event/situation was very imJX)rtant to my physical, psychological, or emotional well-
being; PA 2 = This event/situation was a very JX)Sitive experience for me; PA 3 = This 
event/situation was very threatening to my physical, psychological, or emotional well-being; 
PA 4 = I was very hurt (physically, psychologically, or emotionally) by my experiences in this 
event/situation; PA 5 = This event/situation provided a gcxxi opJX)rtunity for growth, mastery, or 
gain; SA 1 = I had the physical resources available (e.g., health, energy, stamina) that I needed to 
cope with this event/situation; SA 2 = I had the social resources available (e.g., friends, family) 
that I needed to cope with this event/situation; SA 3 = I had the material resources available (e.g., 
money, tools, equipment) that I needed to cope with this event/situation; SA 4 = I had the 
psychological resources available (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, problem-solving skills) that I needed to 
cope with this event/situation; SA 5 = Overall, I was very confident that I could cope with this 
event/situation (with or without assistance). 
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report that the task was threatening to their physical, psychological, or emotional well-
being and that they had been hurt (physically, psychologically, or emotionally) by their 
involvement. At higher anxiety levels, medium fantasizers reported less adequate 
physical and psychological resources needed for coping, along with less confidence that 
they would be able to cope with the situation. 
Low fantasizers who registered greater situational anxiety were more likely than 
nonanxious low fantasizers to believe that some outside force controlled the outcome of 
the task. Higher ST AI-SA scores also corresponded to the perception that the task was 
threatening to their physical, psychological, or emotional well-being. These subjects were 
generally more doubtful regarding the availability of physical and psychological 
resources needed for coping, and were less confident about their overall coping ability 
than were subjects who scored lower on the ST AI-SA. 
STAI-SA and Additional Questions. As shown in Table 7, among high fantasizers, 
higher levels of state anxiety, as reflected on the STAI-SA, correlated significantly with 
feelings of tension, perceived lack of competence, and the belief that imagining they were 
someplace else was ineffective in coping with the task. For the medium group, elevations 
on the ST AI-SA corresponded to greater tension, disinterest, feelings of embarrassment, 
poor self-efficacy, and poor outcome expectancy. However, medium fantasizers who 
scored higher on the ST AI-SA also reported that imagining they were someone else, or 
imagining that they had talent or experience that they did not actually possess, were 
helpful in coping with the situation. Finally, among the low fantasizers, higher state 
anxiety was significantly correlated with tension, embarrassment, poor self-efficacy, and 
feelings of concern. There were no significant correlations between the STAI-SA and AQ 




Pearson Product Moment Correlations Between the STAI-SA and AO items for High, 
Medi um, and Low Fantasizers 
Level of fantasy proneness 
High Medium Low 
(n=12) (n=l3) (n=16) 
Correlation Probability Correla ti on Probability Correlation Probability 
AQ Item Coefficient Level Coefficient Level Coefficient Level 
1 .67 .01 .93 .001 .76 .001 
2 .06 .42 .64 .01 .04 .44 
3 .76 .003 .70 .005 .50 .02 
4 -.17 .29 .83 .001 .41 .06 
5 -.48 .06 -.36 .12 -.63 .006 
6 -.34 .14 -.83 .001 -.83 .001 
7 -.10 .38 -.23 .23 -.34 .11 
8 -.13 .35 -.10 .37 .30 .15 
9 -.04 .46 -.67 .009 -.25 .22 
10 .52 .04 -.30 .19 .42 .08 
11 .15 .34 -.55 .03 -.28 .19 
12 -.23 .24 -.75 .003 -.74 .002 
13 -.46 .07 -.82 .001 -.59 .01 
14 .43 .08 .85 .001 .11 .34 
Note. AQ = Additional Questions. AQ items were in Likert-type format as follows: 
1 = Calm vs. tense; 2 = Interested vs. disinterested; 3 = Competent vs. not competent; 
4 = Good concentration vs. poor concentration; 5 = Concerned vs. unconcerned; 
6 = Extremely embarrassed vs. not at all embarrassed; 7 = Using a great deal of imagina-
tion vs. using no imagination; 8 = Imagination being extremely useful for coping vs. 
imagination not being at all useful; 9 = Extremely helpful imagining you were someone 
else vs. not at all helpful imagining you were someone else; 10 = Extremely helpful 
imagining you were someplace else vs. not at all helpful imagining you were someplace 
else; 11 = Extremely helpful imagining you possessed talents you do not really have vs. 
not at all helpful imagining you possessed talents you do not really have; 12 = Feeling 
very tense vs. feeling not at all tense; 13 = Feeling not at all effective in coping with the 
speech situation vs. feeling extremely effective in dealing with the speech situation; 14 = 
Expecting to do extremely well in delivering the news story vs. expecting to do an 
extremely poor job. 
CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
In general, high fantasizers scored higher than their less fantasy prone counterparts on 
measures of ideation and childhood trauma, which previous research (e.g., Lynn & Rhue, 
1988; Wilson & Barber, 1983) had associated with the construct of fantasy proneness. 
The hypothesized interrelatedness between fantasy proneness, and poor coping skills and 
impaired self-esteem, however, was not supported. Phase 1 of the present study rendered 
numerous correlations based on large samples, increasing the likelihood of obtaining 
weak but significant coefficients. To provide more stringent criteria for interpretation of 
the analyses, only significance levels of .001 or greater will be discussed for data 
pertaining to Phase 1. Smaller group sizes in Phase 2 prompted a conservative 
interpretation of group differences that were significant at the .01 level or greater. 
Support for the construct validity of fantasy proneness and its association with 
psychopathology was indicated by strong correlations between the ICMI and measures of 
cognitive slippage and magical ideation (see Table 1), two aspects of cognitive 
dysfunction that are believed to be characteristic of schizotypical disorders such as 
schizophrenia. This supports Lynn and Rhue's (1988) finding that the ICMI and the 
Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) were strongly correlated; in the 
present study they shared approximately 35 percent of their variance. Results of the 
present study are also consistent with Rhue and Lynn's (1987) finding that high 
fantasizers endorsed more items on the F (Frequency), Pa (Paranoia), Pt (Psychasthenia), 
Sc (Schizophrenia), and Ma (Hypomania) scales of the MMPI. The extensive research 
program of Rhue and Lynn has provided consistent evidence that a sizable minority of 
fantasy prone persons (estimated at between 20 percent and 35 percent) "exhibit 
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significant signs of maladjustment, psychopathology, or deviant ideation, and perhaps a 
smaller proportion of fantasizers can be aptly characterized as schizotypal or borderline 
personalities" (p. 42; Lynn & Rhue, 1988). 
Despite the covariance between the ICMI and measures of schizotypical distortions of 
thought and perception, it failed to correlate significantly with measures of self-esteem 
satisfaction with life (see Table 1). This finding runs counter to expectations that 
higher ICMI scores would correlate negatively with self-esteem and subjective life 
satisfaction. Because satisfaction with life is regarded as a key constituent of mental well-
being (Corcoran & Fischer, 1987), it must be assumed that fantasy prone persons possess 
skills or attributes which somehow neutralize the negative effects of their unusual thought 
processes. Support for Huff's ( 1987) finding that high fantasizers outscored medium and 
low fantasizers on the Anxiety Scale of the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1967) was 
indicated by a significant, albeit weak, association between the ICMI and a measure of 
trait anxiety. 
Fantasy proneness was not strongly correlated with family size or composition (see 
Table 3). Females who were more fantasy prone did report having dreams that were more 
vivid, a greater degree of lucid dreaming (i.e., dreams which can be edited or controlled 
by the dreamer), and better recall of dreams. Similarly, males who scored higher on the 
I CMI reported having dreams that were more vivid and more lucid. As noted by Wilson 
and Barber ( 1983), it can be postulated that dreams constitute an aspect of life that is 
central to the identity and functioning of most fantasy prone individuals. Contrary to 
expectations, fantasy proneness was not strongly associated with the more functional or 
mundane aspects of religiosity (i.e., attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors). (see Table 4). High 
fantasizers have reported greater belief in paranormal experiences than medium and low 
fantasizers (e.g., Council & Huff, 1990). Given earlier results and the current findings, it 
would appear that fantasy prones are more likely than other groups to acknowledge 
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experiencing mystical phenomena, but do not differ in other aspects of their religiosity. In 
the present case, females scoring high on the fantasy proneness measure reported having 
the experience of feeling God's presence, feeling one with God, and feeling united with 
the universe. Males who ranked as being more fantasy prone also tended to be more 
likely to have felt God's presence. 
The results of this study support the hypothesized association between fantasy 
proneness and childhood trauma (see Table 2), with females seeming to account for most 
of the variance. Overall, the ICMI and the Survey of Traumatic Childhood Events shared 
approximately 14 percent of their variance. For females, higher ICMI scores correlated 
with a variety of aversive childhood experiences, including: Extrafamilial sexual abuse, 
verbal or physical abuse by family members, witnessing verbal or physical family 
conflict, extrafamilial physical abuse, major injury or death of a family member, serious 
personal illness or injury, major injury or death of a close friend, and extended social 
isolation. Males with elevated ICMI scores were more likely to report physical abuse by 
nonfamily members during childhood. Despite this apparent discrepancy, there was only 
one significant sex difference among correlation coefficients, and the within sex 
correlations for the total scale were nearly identical (see Table 1). 
In summary, individuals who score high on the fantasy proneness measure are willing 
to acknowledge a wide range of deviant or unusual thoughts, vivid and lucid dreams, 
mystical experiences, and an array of traumatic childhood experiences. Nevertheless, they 
tend to report little trait anxiety and do not differ from less fantasy prone groups in terms 
of their satisfaction with life or their level of self-esteem. Thus, persons manifesting a 
predilection for deviant ideation who also obtain elevated scores on the ICMI seem 
relatively immune to the clinical sequelae of such cognitive distortions; i.e., they report 
only a slight increase in anxiety and are no less satisfied with themselves or their 
circumstances than are other subjects. It may be conjectured that fantasy prone persons 
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have somehow learned to cope with their tendency toward ideational deviance or 
psychopathology. 
When subjected to a laboratory condition designed to elicit performance-related 
anxiety, high, medium, and low fantasizers did not differ significantly in their use of 
various coping strategies, nor were there significant differences in terms of self-reported 
anxiety. The groups were roughly equivalent in terms of whether they viewed the 
situation as irrelevant, benign-positive, or stressful. Furthermore, they did not differ 
significantly in their evaluation of the availability of resources (e.g., physical, social, 
psychological) needed to cope with the situation. Subjects in all three groups reported 
similar levels of predictability, personal involvement or commitment, familiarity, control 
over environmental factors, and control over personal thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 
Other aspects of psychological coping were also comparable across groups. For 
example, the degree to which the coping effort was focused externally on the 
environment or internally on the self was not incumbent upon group membership. 
Whether the subject tended to approach or avoid the situation, and whether she tended to 
adopt an active or passive coping style, also had no relationship to group affiliation. The 
similarity of state anxiety across groups also argues for lack of significant differences in 
terms of coping effectiveness. 
The only significant group differences were obtained on two items supplied by the 
experimenter (see Table 5), which directly addressed the use of imagination and fantasy 
as a method of coping. The high fantasizers exceeded both medium and low fantasizers in 
their use of fantasy and imagination, and in their assessment of how effective these 
variables were in helping them cope with the situation. Compared to other groups, high 
fantasizers clearly believed that using fantasy, imagination, or daydreaming was more 
useful or effective in coping with the task. Interestingly, there were no group differences 
on related variables (e.g., usefulness of imagining they were someone else, imagining 
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they were someplace else, or that they possessed skills, knowledge, experience, or talent 
that they did not actually have). Questions related to self-efficacy and outcome 
expectancy also failed to discriminate among the groups. Finally, high, medium, and low 
fantasizers reported similar levels of interest, competence, concentration, concern, and 
embarrassment in dealing with the laboratory situation. 
Additional analyses were done to determine whether level of anxiety within each of 
the groups exerted a differential effect on the other dependent variables. Thus, it was 
possible to assess the impact of anxiety on coping strategies for each group. As noted 
above, only correlations that were significant at the .01 level will be considered for 
purposes of interpretation. 
Overall, high fantasizers produced five correlation coefficients, significant at the .01 
level, that signified lack of adequate coping skills. By contrast, the medium group 
produced 16 such correlations, and the low group produced nine. High fantasizers who 
indicated higher levels of anxiety were more likely to view the situation as being a 
negative experience, to report being hurt (i.e., physically, psychologically, or 
emotionally), to perceive themselves as lacking the psychological resources (e.g., beliefs, 
attitudes, problem-solving skills) needed to cope, and to feel less competent to deal with 
the situation. 
Medium fantasizers experiencing increased anxiety also rendered the largest number 
of significant correlations indicating impaired coping and negative self-efficacy. Anxious 
medium fantasizers tended to deal with the situation through avoidance, believing that 
they had less control, influence, and understanding of their thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. They were likely to believe the situation was very threatening and that they 
had been hurt physically, psychologically, or emotionally by the procedure. Anxious 
subjects in the medium group also tended to doubt that they possessed the psychological 
(e.g., beliefs, attitudes, problem-solving skills) or physical (e.g., health, energy, stamina) 
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resources needed to cope with the situation. Overall, they expressed considerable lack of 
confidence in coping with the situation. Perhaps in a defensive maneuver, anxious 
medium fantasizers indicated feeling relatively disinterested in the task~ they also 
benefited from imagining they were someone else during the procedure. Poor 
concentration, acute embarrassment, and less favorable outcome expectancy were more 
likely to be reported. 
Members of the low group who reported higher levels of anxiety tended to view the 
situation as being under the control of an external force. They were more likely to believe 
the situation was threatening to their physical, psychological, or emotional well-being, 
and that they lacked the physical (e.g., health, energy, stamina) and psychological (e.g., 
beliefs, attitudes, problem-solving skills) resources required for effective coping. 
In summary, while it may appear that the medium fantasizers acknowledging higher 
levels of anxiety were generally more impaired than anxious members of the high and 
low groups, it should be noted that sample sizes precluded direct comparisons of 
correlation coefficients in determining significant differences. As previously noted, 
anxiety levels did not differ significantly across groups and there were no significant 
group differences in terms of the integrity or effectiveness of coping skills. However, it 
can be stated with certainty that the laboratory condition in Phase 2 was quite anxiety-
provoking for at least a few members of all three groups. 
A content analysis failed to discriminate major group differences in the subjects' 
narrative accounts of their coping strategies. Many subjects used basic self-calming 
cognitions such as reminding themselves that the videotaping was "no big deal," that it 
was "not a life or death situation," or that it would "soon be over." Overall, the low 
fantasizers seemed more pragmatic and practical in their problem-solving: e.g., "I feel a 
little better because I have taken a broadcasting class before. I am trying to remember 
some of the tips that were given in that class. I am trying to remain relaxed by going over 
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in my head how I will give the speech." Another low fantasizer wrote: "I am blocking it 
out. I refuse to think about that at this point. I am only concerned with what I am going to 
say. I 'II worry about what the judges think later. In my mind I am rehearsing the best way 
to relate what I read. I am trying to remember the important points. I guess that's the way 
I live also. I have enough to cope with in one day, I can't worry about what will happen 
tomorrow. I, likewise, am breaking this down in sections and worry about one section at a 
time. I haven't come to the taping yet, so I won't worry about it. I'll just do what I can 
do. This isn't life and death to me-by keeping that perspective I control my anxiety." 
Yet other low fantasizers were quite terse in their introspections: e.g., "I have no anxiety. 
I '11 give the speech then go home. It'll be interesting to see if my video will be used." 
By contrast, high fantasizers reported more extensive use of imagination and fantasy 
as methods to facilitate coping. For instance, one high fantasizer wrote, "I'm going to 
pretend I am all alone and try to forget I am being watched." Another wrote that, "I guess 
I've held conversations in my mind as to what I will say about this experiment to my 
friends." Several high fantasizers described a process of absorption, whereby they 
reduced their anxiety by focusing on internal sensations (e.g., regulating their breathing) 
or on visual stimuli in the environment. A high fantasizer also produced what may have 
been the oddest response of all: i.e., "I used creative visualization (nice word for 
imagination?) and pictured white light moving through my body to illuminate all negative 
self damning thoughts." Similar to low fantasizers, the medium fantasizers seemed more 
practical and mundane in their problem-solving than the high fantasizers; their 
descriptions of imaginal or fantasy-based coping strategies also seemed, at an 
impressionistic level, midway between the two extreme groups. 
Several limitations in the present study are worthy of mention, and may suggest lines 
off uture inquiry. Lynn and Rhue ( 1988) noted that "Scales that measure absorption and 
fantasy proneness rely on subjects' interpretations of their experiences and abilities, and 
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self-reports are notoriously sensitive to social-desirability biases, demand characteristics, 
and context and expectancy effects" (p. 42; see also Lynn & Rhue, 1987). The fact that 
subjects in Phase 1 completed the ICMI before going on to the remaining questionnaires 
in the battery may have created bias in terms of situationally induced expectancies; for 
instance, a subject scoring high on the ICMI may have felt obliged to endorse more items 
on the measures of schizotypy. This threat to internal validity could be compensated for 
by testing subjects over two or more sessions, thereby creating the impression that the 
questionnaires involved are not part of the same study. Parenthetically, Lynn and Rhue 
( 1988) reported that their fantasy prone subjects did not differ from other subjects on a 
measure of social desirability. It is also noteworthy that, in the present study, subjects 
were given strong demands for honesty, including repeated assurances of confidentiality. 
The external validity of_ the present study should not be taken for granted. Fantasy 
prone college students may represent a subset of that population who were able to invest 
heavily in their imaginative involvements while still exhibiting normal or near-normal 
levels of adjustment. Canvassing the general population for high, medium, and low 
fantasizers would be crucial in ruling out the possible singularity of college samples. 
It is highly doubtful that the development and role of fantasy in the lives of young 
fantasizers will adequately be investigated through retrospective data collection. Future 
studies could make greater use of collaborative data from parents, siblings, teachers, etc. 
Most studies off antasy proneness have also relied extensively on interviews or paper-
and-pencil measures; future inquiry should, like the present study, adopt a more empirical 
approach to research in this area. In addition, there is a clear need for more studies, both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal, off antasy-proneness among children. This would help 
answer the etiological problem of whether traumatic childhood experiences (e.g., sexual 
or physical abuse) influence the development of fantasy proneness, or whether certain 
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children become fantasy prone due to their heightened sensitivity or psychological 
vulnerability to traumatic experiences. 
The laboratory procedure in the present study was designed to tap into performance 
anxiety as a means of activating the subjects' characteristic coping behaviors. 
Conceivably, other experimental designs could produce other forms of anxiety (e.g., 
social anxiety, pressure to meet a deadline, exposure to confusing demands), which might 
have better emphasized any group differences in coping styles. There is no reason to 
assume that this procedure exploited the same type of anxiety which high fantasizers 
displayed on the MMPI in a recent study (Huff, 1987). 
A final caveat concerns the ICMI itself, which at present represents the only checklist 
approach to indexing a subject's level of fantasy proneness. Little psychometric data are 
available on the reliability of this instrument. Furthermore, each of the 52 items on the 
ICMI is answered in the same direction, with a "true" response signifying greater fantasy 
proneness. Rewording some of the items to allow for reverse-scoring would help 
minimize the likelihood of an acquiescent response set. Finally, a thorough analysis of the 
inventory's psychometric properties (e.g., factor-analytic studies) could make it possible 
to discard some items which may be highly intercorrelated. 
General Discussion 
The present results are consistent with other data suggesting (e.g., Huff, 1987; Lynn & 
Rhue, 1988; Wilson & Barber, 1983) that fantasy proneness constitutes a method 
whereby certain imaginatively endowed individuals have learned to cope with the effects 
of negative childhood experiences. This conceptualization follows the developmental 
model of fantasy proneness which suggests that a child's normally extensive involvement 
in imaginative activities may serve a protective function in an attempt to cope with 
aversive experiences, such as prolonged social isolation, or physical, sexual, or emotional 
abuse (e.g., Arasteh, 1968; Myers, 1983). Over time, this pattern of imaginative coping 
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may become integrated into the child's developing personality, eventually emerging as 
the fantasy prone personality type. Furthermore, the results suggest that most high 
fantasizers make a satisfactory adjustment in spite of their early traumatic experiences~ 
i.e., fantasizers did not differ from other subjects in their ability to cope with a stressful 
situation and fantasy proneness was not correlated with self-esteem or subjective life 
satisfaction. 
It should be noted that the correlation between fantasy proneness and childhood 
trauma is far from absolute. This would allow for Wilson and Barber's ( 1983) finding 
that many fantasizers were spared a history of childhood trauma, but instead were 
encouraged to imagine and fantasize by significant others, such as parents and teachers. 
Those individuals who developed fantasy proneness as a protection against childhood 
traumata may be over-represented among the minority of fantasizers who exhibit 
significant signs of maladjustment or psychopathology. 
APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 
Directions: While you were preparing to deliver your speech, how did you feel? For those 
items which are numbered, mark your responses directly on your Opscan answer sheet. 
For those items which begin with an asterisks (*), please write your answers onto the 
lined paper that was provided to you. 
1. A B C D E F G 
Calm/relaxed Nervous/tense 
2. A B C D E F G 
Interested Disinterested 
3. A B C D E F G 
Competent Not Competent 
4. A B C D E F G 
Good Poor 
Concentration Concentration 
5. A B C D E F G 
Concerned Unconcerned 
6. A B C D E F G 
Extremely Not at all 
embarrassed embarrassed 
*How are you coping with the prospect of having your speech evaluated by a panel of 
judges? On the lined answer sheet, describe how you are mentally and emotionally cop-
ing with this situation (i.e., what mental strategies are you using to reduce your anxiety 
and plan your delivery of the news story?). Please be specific. 
*Did you use imagination, fantasy or daydreaming to cope with this task? On the lined 
paper, describe exactly what you imagined in order to cope (or leave blank if you did not 
use imagination or fantasy to deal with the situation). 
7. (Continuation of previous question.) How much imagination or fantasy did you use? 
A B C 
A great deal 
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D E F G 
None 
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8. (Continuation of previous question.) In general, how useful or effective was it for you 




C D E F G 
Not at all 
useful 
*Did you cope with this task by imagining that you were someone else? On the lined 
paper, describe how this helped you cope ( or leave blank if you did not imagine that you 
were someone else in order to deal with the situation). 
9. (Continuation of previous question.) Indicate how helpful it was to imagine that you 




C D E F G 
Not helpful 
at all 
*Did you cope with this task by imagining that you were someplace else? On the lined 
paper, describe how this helped you cope (or leave blank if you did not imagine that you 
were someplace else in order to deal with the situation). 
10. (Continuation of previous question.) Indicate how helpful it was to imagine that you 




C D E F G 
Not helpful 
at all 
*Did you cope with this task by imagining that you possessed skills, knowledge, expe-
rience, or talent that you don't really have? On the lined paper, describe how this helped 
you cope ( or leave blank if you did not imagine that you were someplace else in order to 
deal with the situation). 
11. (Continuation of previous question.) Indicate how helpful was it to imagine that you 




C D E F G 
Not helpful 
at all 
12. How tense did you become when you prepared to deliver the speech? Please rate your 
tension level at its highest point. 
A B C 
Very 
tense 
D E F G 
Not at all 
tense 
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APPENDIX 2: DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
Instructions: This survey asks questions about many aspects of your personal and social 
life. Please respond as honestly as you can, and be assured that your answers will be kept 
confidential. 
1. What was the total size of your family when you were a child (before the age of 12 
years)? Include parents and any adopted brothers and sisters, but do not count younger 
brothers or sisters who died before you were six months old. 
A = 2 
B = 3 
C = 4 
D = 5 
E = 6 
F = 7 
G = 8 
H = 9 
I = 10 
J = more than 10 
2. What is your birth order? Fill in "A" on your answer sheet if you were the first born 
child, etc.; do not count younger brothers or sisters who died before you were six months 
old. 
A = first born 
B = second born 
C = third born 
D = fourth born 
E = fifth born 
F = sixth born 
G = seventh born 
H = eighth born 
I = ninth born 
J = beyond ninth born 
3. Specify the number of your younger brothers: 
A = 0 
B = 1 
C = 2 
D = 3 
E = 4 
F = 5 
G = 6 
H = 7 
I = 8 
J = more than eight 
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4. Specify the number of your older brothers: 
A = 0 
B = 1 
C = 2 
D = 3 
E = 4 
F = 5 
G = 6 
H = 7 
I = 8 
J = more than eight 
5. Specify the number of your younger sisters: 
A = 0 
B = 1 
C = 2 
D = 3 
E = 4 
F = 5 
G = 6 
H = 7 
I = 8 
J = more than eight 
6. Specify the number of your older sisters: 
A = 0 
B = 1 
C = 2 
D = 3 
E = 4 
F = 5 
G = 6 
H = 7 
I = 8 
J = more than eight 
7. On the average, how many close friends (confidantes) did you have at any given time 
before the age of 12 years? 
A. No close friends 
B. One close friend 
C. Two close friends 
D. Three close friends 
E. Four or more close friends 
8. In general, how vivid/life-like are your dreams? 
A B C D E F G 
Not vivid Extremely 
at all vivid 
-, 
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9. In general, how pleasant/pleasurable are your dreams? Focus on the feelings or emo-
tions they evoke in you, not so much on the content. 
A B C D E F G 
Extremely Extremely 
unpleasant pleasant 
10. On the average, what percentage of your dreams do you recall the next day? 
A = approximate! y O % 
B = approximately 10% 
C = approximate! y 20% 
D = approximately 30% 
E = approximate! y 40% 
F = approximately 50% 
G = approximately 60% 
H = approximately 70% 
I = approximately 80% 
J = approximate! y 90% to 100% 
11. What percentage of your dreams are you able to edit or control while you are dream-
ing? 
A = approximate! y O % 
B = approximate I y 10% 
C = approximately 20% 
D = approximately 30% 
E = approximate! y 40% 
F = approximate! y 50% 
G = approximate! y 60% 
H = approximately 70% 
I = approximately 80% 
J = approximately 90% to 100% 
APPENDIX 3: INVENTORY OF CHILDHOOD MEMORIES AND IMAGININGS* 
Instructions: This inventory was designed to assess a variety of memories and experi-
ences, some of which are quite ordinary and some rather unusual. Please answer as 
honestly as possible and do not be concerned if you find that almost all of the items or 
almost none apply to you. The first set of items concerns childhood imaginative activities, 
fantasies, and related experiences, and how these might carry over into adult functioning. 
THESE ITEMS ARE IN "TRUE-FALSE" FORMAT. Please mark "A" on your answer 
sheet if the item applies to you, and "B" if it does not. 
1. When I was a child, I enjoyed active movement such as running and jumping. 
2. When I was a child, I enjoyed swinging ( on a swing). 
3. When I was a child, I liked some kinds of music. 
4. When I was a child, I enjoyed cartoons (on TV or in movies). 
5. I can remember clearly one or more things that happened to me when I was two years 
of age or younger. 
6. When I remember back to when I was 6, 7, or 8 years of age, I can re-experience 
myself as a child; that is, I can "see" and "hear" again what I saw and heard then and I 
can feel again the emotions and sensations I felt then. 
7. Although I have grown and I've had more experience, I still feel basically the same as I 
did when I was a child. 
8. When I was a child, I believed in such beings as fairies, leprechauns, or elves, etc. 
9. Now that I am an adult, I still in some sense believe in such beings as fairies, 
leprechauns, or elves, etc. 
10. When I was a child, I would dream or imagine I was flying with such vividness that I 
felt as if I actually did fly. 
11. When I was a child, I enjoyed fairy tales. 
12. As an adult, I would still enjoy fairy tales. 
13. When I was a child, I was very imaginative. 
*Source: Myers, S. A. (1983). The Creative Imagination Scale: Group norms for children 




14. At the present time, I am very imaginative. 
15. When I was a child, I was "a childhood philosopher." That is, I spent time thinking 
about such things as the meaning of life and of death, about hypocrisy, levels of exis-
tence, etc. 
16. When I was a young child (below age 12), I preferred playing make-believe games 
which require imagining or pretending, such as cowboys, school house, etc. I preferred 
such make-believe games over realistic games which require skills such as hopscotch, 
checkers, building things, ball games, etc. 
17. When I was playing make-believe games as a child, I usually would imagine so 
vividly that what I pretended seemed real to me. 
18. When I was a child, I lived in a make-believe world much or most of the time. 
19. As an adult, I still occasionally live in a make-believe world. 
20. When I was a young child, I believed that my doll(s) or stuffed animals were alive. 
21. When I was a child, I had an imaginary companion (or companions) such as an 
imagined person, animal, or object which I talked to, shared feelings with, or took along 
with me. 
22. When I was a child, I would at times pretend and in some sense believe I was some-
one else such as a fairy tale character (e.g., Snow White, Peter Pan, Rapunzel), a prince or 
princess, an orphan, etc. 
23. As an adult, I occasionally pretend I am someone else. 
24. When I was a child, I would have enjoyed or I did enjoy taking ballet dancing lessons. 
25. When I was a child or teenager, at times I was afraid my imagining would become so 
real to me that I would be unable to stop it. 
26. When I was a child or teenager, sometimes I was accused of lying when I was just 
reporting what I had imagined. 
27. When I was a young (pre-teenage) child, I had sexual fantasies. 
28. I have had an orgasm ( or orgasms) just by imagining only. 
29. When I was a child, I would spend at least half of my total waking day imagining. 
30. Now as an adult, I spend a substantial part of my total waking day imagining. 
31. If I could not imagine anymore, besides other effects it would have on my life,/ 
wouldn't be me anymore-I would be a basically different person. 
32. At times, when I was a child or adolescent, it was difficult for me to determine 
whether something had actually happened or whether I had imagined it happened. 
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33. If given the opportunity, I would be very eager to experience an entirely new 
sensation-a sensation such as vision, hearing, smell, or touch but as different from all of 
these as they are all different from each other. 
34. I have had a deeply moving personal religious, spiritual, or mystical experience. 
35. I have felt, heard, or seen an apparition (a spirit or ghost). 
36. I have had an out-of-the-body experience; that is, I have felt as if "I" (my mind or 
my spirit) left my body and existed for a while independently of my body. 
37. I have experienced precognition (prophecy or foretelling the future) in a dream or 
while awake. That is, I have known something would happen before it happened even 
though there was no rational way I could have known. 
38. I have at times written poems, inspirational messages, stories, or songs, etc., and I did 
not feel it was I who was creating them. 
39. I have at times felt unexplainably compelled to go somewhere or to do something I 
wouldn't ordinarily do (such as call someone I wouldn't ordinarily call) and then later 
discovered there was a reason for my compulsion. (For instance, the person I called des-
perately needed me at that moment.) 
40. I believe reincarnation is possible, and I have become aware of a life ( or lives) that I 
may have lived prior to this time. 
41. I have at some time in my life experimented with marijuana, psychedelic drugs (LSD, 
etc.), amphetamines ("uppers"), tranquilizers ("downers"), or other such drugs in order to 
experience the world in a new way, not just to relax or feel good. 
42. I would like to experience hypnosis ( or I have enjoyed experiencing hypnosis). 
43. I think I am hypnotizable; that is, I think I could be hypnotized (or I have been hyp-
notized). 
44. I have at times thought something happened to me, developed physical symptoms but 
later I found out that what I thought happened never actually occurred. (Some possible 
examples to illustrate this are as follows: (a) you thought something was in your eye, 
your eye became irritated, but you couldn't find anything in your eye; (b) or you thought 
you ate spoiled food, became ill, but later found out that others eating the same food were 
not bothered; (c) or you thought you touched poison ivy, developed an itch but the doctor 
said it wasn't poison ivy.) 
45. (Females only; males answer "false.") I have at some time in my life thought I was 
pregnant and in addition to not menstruating, developed other symptoms of pregnancy 
(e.g., morning sickness, abdominal enlargement, breast changes), only to find out later 
that I was not pregnant. 
46. While listening to my favorite music, in addition to experiencing mood changes (e.g., 
feeling calm, relaxed, energetic, mellow) I also often experience a transformation (e.g., a 
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feeling of oneness with the music, or being transported to the past or to another place or 
time). 
47. When I remember significant events in my life, in addition to thinking about them, I 
can also re-experience them. That is, I can see again what I saw then, hear again the 
sounds, voices, etc., as I heard them before, feel the emotions and sensations I felt then. I 
can re-live them-not just think about them or see them in my mind's eye. 
48. I can vividly re-experience in my imagination such things as: the feeling of a gentle 
breeze, warm sand under bare feet, the softness of fur, cool grass, the warmth of the sun, 
and the smell of freshly cut grass. 
49. When asked to close my eyes and imagine holding a baby or an animal ( dog, cat, etc.) 
on my lap,/ can experience it as if it were actually there. That is, I can feel its weight and 
warmth, touch it, see it, hear it, etc. 
50. At times just before I fall asleep, I experience vivid images. 
51. Many or most of my dreams tend to be at least as vivid as actual life experiences. 
52. If I wish, I am usually able to finish or change a dream after I awaken. 
APPENDIX 4: SURVEY OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS* 
1. What statement do you agree with the most? 
A. I don't believe in God or an ultimate Religious Reality (some power, being, 
force, or energy that holds things together and influences the world's destiny). 
B. I don't think it is possible for me to know whether God or an ultimate Religious 
Reality exists. 
C. I am uncertain but lean toward not believing in an ultimate Religious Reality. 
D. I am uncertain but lean toward believing. 
E. I definitely believe that God or some ultimate Religious Reality exists. 
2. Which statement do you most strongly agree with? 
A. God is in charge of everything that happens in my life. 
B. God has a plan for my life. If I listen to God, the plan with become known to 
me, and then I can act on it. 
C. God is not automatically in charge of persons' lives. But if I ask God for help 
and direction, he will enter my life and help direct me. 
D. I am in charge of my own life, but God will give me help if I ask him. 
E. God may have a plan for my life, or may be in my life, but I'm not sure. 
F. God has put us in charge of our own lives. We are able to make our own 
mistakes. I am on my own, but I am aware of what God hopes we will be and 
what he expects from us. 
G. God has put us in charge of our own lives. Because he loved me, I am in the 
world with a certain attitude. 
H. I am in charge of my life. God is not involved directly or indirectly. 
3. Is there life after death? 
A. Yes 
B. Not sure 
C.No 
4. Which of these five statements is truest for you? 
A. God is the strongest influence in my life. 
B. God is a very strong influence in my life. 
C. God is a moderate influence in my life. 
D. God has a small influence in my life. 
E. God has no influence in my life. 
*Source: Benson, P. L., & Williams, D. L. (1982). Religion on capitol hill: Myths and 
Realities. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers. 
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Generally speaking, how much do each of the following have to do with determining 
what happens in peoples lives? Use this scale to respond to each item: 
A B C D E 
No influence Extreme influence 
5. God 
6. Satan, or some evil force 
7. The exercise of free will 
8. The social system-its economic and political arrangements 
9. One's values and motives 
10. The kind of environment one grew up in 
11. One's abilities and skills 
12. One's inherited traits and capacities 
13. Which of the following images of human nature is most true in your opinion? 
A. Predominantly evil, sinful. 
B. Selfish, competitive. 
C. Predominantly good. 
D. Loving, cooperative. 
Which, if any, of these religious experiences have you had? Respond with "A" if you 
have had the experience, and "B" if you have not had the experience. 
14. The experience of having God speak to me. 
15. The experience of feeling God's presence. 
16. The experience of feeling one with God. 
17. The experience of feeling united with the universe. 
18. A born-again experience in which Jesus entered my life. 
19. The experience of speaking in tongues. 
20. The experience of specific answer to prayer. 
21. Which statement is most true for you? (Choose only one.) 
A. My religious beliefs and convictions are at the center of my life. 
B. My religious beliefs are moderately important to me. 
C. My religious beliefs are not too important for me. 
D. I do not believe in religion. 
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22. Are you a member of a church or synagogue? 
A. Yes 
B.No 
23. What is your level of church attendance? 
A. More than once a week 
B. Weekly 
C. One to three times a month 
D. Less than once a month 
E. Never attend (if less than once per year answer "never") 
24. How often do you read Scripture? 
A. Daily 
B. Once a week or more, but less than daily 
C. One to three times a month 
D. Less than once a month 
E. Never ( if less than once per year answer "never") 
25. How often do you pray? 
A. Daily 
B. Once a week or more, but less than daily 
C. One to three times a month 
D. Less than once a month 
E. Never (if less than once per year answer "never") 




27. God did not play a role in the writing of Scripture. 
A. True 
B. Not sure 
C. False 
APPENDIX 5: SURVEY OF TRAUMATIC CHILDHOOD EVENTS* 
Instructions: The following items describe a number of events which may disrupt a 
child's life and affect his or her happiness and functioning. Using the scale t);~low, indi-
cate how many times (if at all) any of these events occurred in your childhood or adoles-
cence. Please be open and honest in your responses. 
Number of occurrences: (A) none (B) 1 (C) 2 to 5 (D) 6 to 10 
(E) more than 10 times 
1. Moved to a new town, started in a new school, had to make new friends. 
2. Your parents were divorced or separated. 
3. A serious illness or operation which required you to be hospitalized or miss much 
school. 
4. Having a major injury or accident. 
5. Having an abortion or miscarriage. 
6. A parent, sibling or other close family member was hospitalized because of a serious 
illness or operation. 
7. Major injury or accident of parent, sibling or other close family member. 
8. The death of a parent, sibling or other close family member. 
9. Major injury or accident of close personal friend. 
10. Serious illness or operation of close personal friend. 
11. The death of a close personal friend. 
12. Having your house destroyed or damaged (e.g., by flood, fire, or earthquake). 
13. Having your home robbed or vandalized. 
14. Being confronted by a person and robbed of money or belongings. 
15. Being struck or beaten up by someone other than a family member (e.g., school bully, 
stranger). 
*Source: Council, J. R., & Edwards, P. W. (1986). Survey of Traumatic Childhood 
Events. Unpublished research measure, North Dakota State University. 
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16. Being spanked by your parents or other caregivers (e.g., older sibling, baby-sitter) 
severely enough to cause bruises or other injuries. 
17. Being struck or hit by your parents, other family members or caregivers. 
18. Being struck or hit by someone who wanted to injure you and requiring medical 
attention (e.g., broken bone, stitches). 
19. Being yelled and screamed at by a parent, other family member or caregiver. 
20. Observing or hearing your parents fighting. 
21. Seeing one of your parents being physically abused by the other (e.g., struck, shoved). 
22. Seeing one of your siblings being physically abused or verbally berated by your par-
ent(s). 
23. A family member or relative exposed their sex organs to you when you did not want 
or expect this to happen. 
24. Another person exposed their sex organs to you when you did not want or expect this 
to happen. 
25. A family member or relative touched you in a sexual way when you did not want or 
expect this to happen. 
26. Another person touched you in a sexual way when you did not want or expect this to 
happen. 
27. A family member or relative made you or asked you to engage in a sexual activity 
when you did not want to. 
28. Another person made you or asked you to engage in a sexual activity when you did 
not want to. 
29. You were isolated from friends or playmates for a long period(s) of time (e.g., due to 
quarantine, chronic illness, foreign travel, living on an isolated farm). 
30. Continuation of item 29: Average period of time spent in isolation = 
(A) no isolation (B) 1 week (C) 1 month (D) 6 months (E) more than 1 year. 
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